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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Historically,  Israel  paid  its non-proﬁt  hospitals  on  a  perdiem  (PD)  basis.  Recently,  like other
OECD  countries,  Israel  has  moved  to  activity-based  payments.  While  most  countries  have
adopted  a diagnostic  related  group  (DRG)  payment  system,  Israel  has chosen  a Procedure-
Related Group  (PRG)  system.  This  differs  from  the  DRG  system  because  it classiﬁes  patients
by procedure  rather  than  diagnosis.  In Israel,  the PRG  system  was  found  to be more  feasible
given the  lack  of data  and  information  needed  in  the DRG  classiﬁcation  system.  The  Ministry
of Health  (MoH)  chose  a payment  scheme  that  depends  only  on  inhouse  creation  of  PRG
codes  and  costing,  thus  avoiding  dependence  on  hospital  data.  The  PRG  tariffs  are priced  by
a joint  Health  and Finance  Ministry  commission  and  updated  periodically.  Moreover,  PRGs
are  believed  to achieve  the  same  main  efﬁciency  objectives  as  DRGs:  increasing  the  volume
of activity,  shortening  unnecessary  hospitalization  days,  and  reducing  the  gaps  between
the costs  and  prices  of  activities.  The  PRG  system  is  being  adopted  through  an  incremental
reform  that  started  in 2002  and  was  accelerated  in  2010.  The  Israeli  MoH  involved  the
main  players  in the  hospital  market  in  the  consolidation  of  this  potentially  controversial
reform  in order  to  avoid  opposition.  The  reform  was implemented  incrementally  in order
to preserve  the  balance  of resource  allocation  and  overall  expenditures  of the  system,  thus
becoming  budget  neutral.  Yet,  as long  as  gaps  remain  between  marginal  costs  and  prices  of
procedures, PRGs  will not  attain  all their  objectives.  Moreover,  it is  still  crucial  to reﬁne  PRG
rates  to  reﬂect  the  severity  of  cases,  in order  to tackle  incentives  for  selection  of patients
within  each  procedure.
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1. Background
Since 1995, Israel has had a national health insurance
(NHI) system that provides a broad beneﬁts package to all
Israeli citizens and permanent residents, which the govern-
ment updates each year. The system is ﬁnanced primarily
from public sources via payroll and general tax revenues.
n access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
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The share of public ﬁnancing has declined to 61% of total
health system ﬁnancing [1].
Four competing, non-proﬁt health plans (HPs) are
responsible for providing their members with the NHI
package and ensuring reasonable accessibility and avail-
ability of services. They provide care in the community and
procure hospital services. There are four HPs; two of them,
Clalit and Maccabi, cover almost 80% of Israel’s residents.
Both own general hospitals: Clalit owns eight general non-
proﬁt hospitals (30% of acute care beds) whereas Maccabi
owns ﬁve for-proﬁt hospitals (about 3% of acute care beds).
In addition to its regulatory, planning and policymak-
ing roles, the Israeli Ministry of Health (MoH) owns and
operates about half of the nation’s acute care hospital beds.
Approximately 80% of the revenue of all 45 public gen-
eral hospitals in Israel comes from the HPs’ payments for
services. The remaining 20% comes from sales of services to
other public bodies (e.g., the National Insurance Institute)
and private services such as those not included in the NHI
package and medical tourism [2]. In 2014, the rate of acute
care beds per 1000 populations in Israel was lower than the
OECD average (1.9 compared to 3.3) [3].
From the late 1970s, public hospitals in Israel were
paid per-diem (PD) fees for inpatient care; during the
1990s, activity-based payments were introduced through
the establishment of 30 Procedure Related Groups (PRG).
Emergency and ambulatory care in hospitals are paid on a
fee-for-service (FFS) base. In 2012, 23% of the gross revenue
of government-owned hospitals was for inpatient care paid
by PRG, 40% for inpatient care paid by PD, 21% for ambula-
tory care paid by FFS or PRGs, 8% for births paid by PRGs and
6% for emergency care paid by FFS [4]. Maximum price lists
for all hospital services are mandated by law and set by the
government, through a joint MoH  and Ministry of Finance
(MoF) pricing committee. Since June 2015, as part of the
mental healthcare reform, HPs have been purchasing inpa-
tient care from psychiatric and general hospitals. Payments
for these services are based mainly on PD fees. Prices for
these services, similarly to those for other hospital services,
are set by the MoH  [2].
The objective of this paper is to analyze how and why
Israel adopted activity-based hospital payment by PRG.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we  intro-
duce the PRG system and reform, in Section 3, we discuss
problems that the PRG reform aims to address. In Section
4, we analyze the stakeholders’ positions and inﬂuence. In
Section 5, we describe the current tools available to assess
the payment reform and in Section 6 we conclude and dis-
cuss the paper.
2. The Procedure-Related Group incremental
reform
In the last decade, efforts to reform the Israeli health-
care system have been more intensive than at any time
since the passing of the NHI law. Many of these efforts have
been, or are in the process of being, implemented, among
them the PRG payment reform, which consolidates hospital
costing, pricing, and payment mechanisms by the MoH. It
is part of the Ministry’s broader policy of strengthening the
public health system, particularly the hospital market. Theolicy 120 (2016) 1171–1176
reform has been implemented incrementally since 2002
and boosted since 2010.
The objectives of the PRG reform are:
1. To set consistent costing and pricing mechanisms and
improve public hospitals’ ﬁnancial balance.
2. To reﬁne the unit of payment, by shifting from PD to
activity-based payments.
3. To improve the MoH’s capacity to set policy and priori-
ties and to supervise and control.
2.1. Description of the PRG payment system
Characteristically, the PRG payment method is based
on the principal procedure carried out, rather than diag-
nosis. When Israel needed to implement a new payment
mechanism, there were insufﬁcient data to build accurate
diagnosis-related groups (DRG groups), as is done in most
European countries. The solution proposed by the MoH  was
to build “in house” PRG codes based on its own data collec-
tion for micro-costing and pricing.
The PRG tariff includes all hospital costs involved in
performing the procedure (i.e., operating room, equip-
ment, overheads, and wages). The PRG tariffs are regularly
updated based on the health cost index and, sometimes, on
improved costing methods. There is an additional payment
for patients who  undergo more than one major procedure
in different organs.
PRG codes are calculated based on the International
Statistical Classiﬁcation of Diseases and Related Health
Problems (ICD-9-CM) codiﬁcation, where each PRG can
be one or a group of ICD-9-CM procedure codes. The
description of each PRG is based on Current Procedure Ter-
minology (CPT) codes.
PRGs do not take account of diagnoses or patient char-
acteristics (e.g., age, sex, co-morbidities, severity). The PRG
pricing is “budget-neutral;w¨hen determining the price of
a new PRG or updating the price of an existing PRG, the
hospitals and HPs do not earn or lose funds. However,
the mechanism might change the budget allocation within
each group (i.e., across hospitals or across HPs). This restric-
tion requires two parallel items of information for the
pricing of a certain PRG: it’s costing and the quantities used.
The “budget-neutral” requirement poses one major con-
straint for the reform if it is to attain its objectives, as it
might force the pricing to be inaccurate or be such that
it provides perverse incentives and does not necessarily
reduce the gaps between costs and prices for certain proce-
dures. If the marginal cost of a procedure is higher than its
marginal price, hospitals might have incentives to under-
provide care or avoid the procedure. Similarly, when the
marginal cost of a procedure is lower, then the incentive
is to overprovide care or to prefer a proﬁtable procedure
to another one. For details of the PRG costing and pricing
mechanism, see Appendix of Supplementary material.
2.2. The PRG adoption processSince 2010, the amount of PRG codes and hospital
revenues from activities paid by PRGs have signiﬁcantly
increased. Fig. 1 (left) shows the upward trend in the
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ercentage of total discharges with at least one PRG code;
nd (right) the increase in hospitals’ revenues from PRGs,
hich have been replacing PD payments.
Fig. 2 and Table 1 present the reform timeline. Until
002, there were few PRG codes for the most common
rocedures. The ﬁrst wave of the reform was 2002–2009
hen 70 new codes were created. In 2010, the reform gath-
red momentum and an additional 73 codes were created
hat year. Since then, the MoH  has been deﬁning PRGs
s waves, with dozens of codes by specialty-groups, e.g.,
rauma (mainly “high-energy” orthopedic surgeries), urol-
gy and orthopedics. At the beginning of 2016, there were
81 PRG codes, which accounted for more than a third of
npatient care and more than half of total procedures [5].
The trend is to keep adopting PRGs for surgical depart-
ents and departments where invasive procedures are
erformed (i.e., cardiology, gastroenterology). The PD will
emain the main payment scheme for other inpatient care
epartments.
. Problems that the PRG reform aims to address
The PRG reform does not purport to resolve all system
evel challenges but it has several goals (mentioned above)
hat were meant to address the following problems:
.1. Lack of transparent costing and methodical pricing
echanisms that led to inappropriate payment levels
Until 2010, MoH  PD fees were not based on a methodi-
al costing and pricing process. Prices were set about two
ecades ago, based on the historical expenditures of certain
ospitals. Since 1985, a pricing committee has periodically
pdated the rates, but has not revised the calculation for-
ula and despite annual adjustments, there were no clear
osting and pricing methods [6].
The hospitals were underpaid for many activities, whilehey were overpaid for others. Since all public hospitals
ave been facing growing deﬁcits, it can be assumed that
uring the last decade more activities were underpaid
ather than overpaid. Under-compensation can lead to*Includes only elective non-birth hospitalizations
deﬁcits and long waiting times. Over-compensation pro-
vides incentives to increase activity, which could result
in the provision of ﬁnancially unsustainable or medically
inappropriate care. Both over- and under-compensation
create incentives for selection [7].
The solution suggested by the reform was to set consistent
and standardized costing and pricing mechanisms and to
strengthen public hospitals’ ﬁnancial balance.
3.2. Payment mechanism that was  not sensitive enough
to reimburse hospitals fairly
The payment mechanism prior to the PRG reform was
based mainly on PD. The PD unit of payment (hospi-
talization day) is less sensitive to cost variation of the
different cases, especially those in surgical departments
and departments where invasive procedures are per-
formed. Moreover, PD payments do not constitute an
incentive for the hospitals to perform procedures. In the
public sector, this led to underutilization of resources
in hospitals and aggravated growing waiting times for
elective procedures, particularly for procedures that were
under-reimbursed.
A consistent costing and pricing mechanism was  essen-
tial but not sufﬁcient to solve this problem. Therefore, the
solution suggested by the reform was  to reﬁne the unit of
payment shifting from PD to activity-based payments for
surgical departments and departments where invasive pro-
cedures are performed.
3.3. Payment mechanism that made it difﬁcult for the
MoH to set policy and monitor activities
PD payments do not require hospitals to provide the
MoH  transparent data on their activities. The lack of data
posed difﬁculties for the ministry to monitor and assess
hospitals’ performance and efﬁciency. It also limited its
ability to prioritize hospital activities, such as improving
or increasing outputs, prioritizing access to advanced tech-
nology, or shortening waiting times.
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Table 1
PRG waves and specialties.
PRG stages Pre-reform
1988–2002
2002–2009 2010–2012 2013 2014 2015
Specialties covered All specialties All specialties Trauma focus
 orthope
nd surg
Urology, Ophthalmology, Orthopedics
on
ha
Source: Special analysis by the authors of MoH  data.
Payment mechanisms can be used by regulators to pro-
mote policy objectives because they offer incentives that
affect the behavior of providers [8]. In this view, the solu-
tion suggested by the reform was that the MoH  use PRGs to
enhance collection of data about hospitals’ activities and
quality of care to improve the ministry’s capacity to set
policy and priorities and to supervise and control. PRGs
also enable the MoH  to intervene in hospitals’ activities.
For instance, they can raise the price of a certain procedure
to shorten its waiting times or reduce the price of another
procedure that was less cost-effective than its alternative.
4. Stakeholders’ positions and inﬂuence on the PRG
reform
The four main stakeholders in the hospital market are
powerful: the MoH, MoF, HPs and hospitals. The MoH  aims
to increase the public budget for healthcare, particularly for
public hospitals, in the most effective way. The MoF  is more
concerned with ﬁscal responsibility and sustainability and
consequently prefers to curb inpatient care expenditure.
The MoF  sets the annual government funding level for NHI
and is inﬂuential in all healthcare decisions that have bud-
getary implications. [9]. The four HPs prefer to reduce their
expenditures, especially on services provided by others,
e.g., those purchased from hospitals. Hospitals, in turn, are
important players because their cooperation is crucial for
the implementation of the reform.
Fig. 3 represents our analysis of the positions of each of
the players, who can be divided into two groups: regulators
and providers.
The regulators have strong inﬂuence on the reform. At
the beginning of the reform, they held different positions.
The MoH  was more strongly in favor of the reform than
the MoF. The MoF  was very concerned about the possibil-
ity of supply-induced-demand, i.e., that the reform would
increase the incentives for hospitals to over-treat. Since itdics,
ery
general surgery ENT, general
surgery
(non-trauma),
MRI
was  clear that the current situation of compensation by
PD was  much more problematic, as long as the budget-
neutral requirement was kept, the MoF  played along with
the MoH’s enhancements to the PRG reform. It was only in
2014, when the data regarding the impact of the reform,
i.e., procedures’ quantities and prices, began to accumu-
late that the MoF  changed its position and became more
in favor of the reform. In the regulators’ group, while the
MoF is more concerned with “how much” is to be allocated
to hospitals, the MoH  is more concerned with “how” these
resources will be allocated across hospitals and between
hospitals and HPs.
Within the providers’ group, both players are con-
cerned with “how much” the reform adds to or takes
away from their income or expenditures. The HPs claim
that the budget-neutral requirement will not necessarily
be accurate or maintained at the HP level and are there-
fore concerned about the increase in their expenditure
on inpatient care. For the same reason, the hospitals are
concerned that their income will be reduced. Therefore,
budget-neutral reform seems to be the closest solution pos-
sible to reconcile all interests.
Bearing in mind each player’s considerations, the MoH
opted for an incremental reform, which would be smooth
enough for the players to adjust to the changes during
the implementation process. In addition, while consolidat-
ing the reform, the MoH  strategically kept all players in
the picture – either actively involved (MoF) or informed
in advance (hospitals and HPs) – in order to avoid their
opposition.
In conclusion, the MoH  has attempted to develop a
simple payment scheme that is relatively easy to imple-
ment and will be acceptable to all players involved.
Although the reform chosen was not the only way to
address the mentioned market failures, it was the one that
policymakers believed implementable—practically, politi-
cally and strategically.
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. Tools to assess the payment reform
Alongside the payment reform, the MoH  launched three
nitiatives to improve the hospital market whose outputs
an be used to assess the effects of the payment reform:
. The National Program of Quality Measures (NPQM) in
Hospitals, launched in 2013, which measures and moni-
tors performance and quality of care in general hospitals
[10]. The MoH  can use measurement outputs to moni-
tor whether the increasing utilization of the PRG scheme
affects the quality of care. Although, the NPQM in hos-
pitals does not relate directly to the PRG reform, there
is internal collaboration between two relevant teams in
the MoH.
. Measuring waiting times: Since 2012, the MoH  has
required all Israeli public and non-proﬁt hospitals to
report waiting times for 23 elective operations by source
of funding [11]. Since 2014, the data have been collected
and published in the public domain regularly. This might
help the MoH  to partially assess whether PRGs are reduc-
ing waiting times.
. Reﬁning PRG costing and pricing: The MoH  has started
re-evaluating and reﬁning the micro-costing methods
and units, recalculating the costs of the resources basic
units (such as physicians’ wages and operating room
costs), and reviewing the quantities of resources used
for each PRG.
Aside from these monitoring tools, no academic policy
valuation has been conducted to date.
. Conclusions and discussion
Israel has been adopting activity-based payments for
ublic hospitals (the PRG reform). The timing of the change
as similar to other European countries [12–14].
Unlike most European countries, Israel did not “import”
he DRG system, but chose instead to develop its own sys-
em based on PRGs because it was more feasible, givenﬂuence on the PRG reform.
the lack of data needed in a DRG classiﬁcation system. The
MoH  chose a payment scheme that depends only on in-
house coding and micro-costing, thus avoiding dependence
on hospital data. Moreover, PRGs are believed to achieve
the same main efﬁciency objectives as DRGs: increasing
volume of activity, shortening unnecessary hospitalization
days, reducing the gaps between the costs and prices of
activities, and reimbursing public providers more fairly.
The method has several substantial disadvantages:
 It is not currently applicable for diagnoses or admissions
that lack interventional procedures.
 As long as it is not adjusted for patients’ characteristics
and severity, it retains incentives for selection due to
variations of cost across patients groups.
 The budget-neutral constraint weakens the ability of
PRGs to narrow the unintended cost-price gaps.
 Similar to DRGs, PRGs raises concerns about impairing
quality of care due to reduced ALoS. Quality of care must
therefore be monitored.
Lessons for other countries. The Israeli experience can
inspire other countries regarding the way  to:
1. Implement a controversial reform by involving the main
actors in its formulation and consolidation, thus avoid-
ing opposition
2. Implement activity-based payments with a partial
database with few consistent, uniform and transpar-
ent data on hospitals activities, or without a developed
patient-classiﬁcation group system
3. Implement an incremental reform of hospitals’ payment
system, constantly monitoring changes in quality of care
and waiting times.To conclude, in countries where there is evidence of
gaps between the costs and payment of hospitals’ activities,
one of the recommendations is to shift to activity-based
payments. Where there is a lack of data, platform, or polit-
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ical environment, PRGs are an implementable alternative
to DRGs with most advantages of the latter method.
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